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Dear Editors:

cost to themselves, just because their emotions and their instinct guides them to.
Revenge, as modeled in these games, makes
no sense. The individual costs are always
greater than any individual benefits; however, great numbers of people still do it.
Why? One theory is that individuals will
punish cheaters because it sets a precedent
and a warning that will deter future actors
who may consider cheating in the next
round. Punishing cheaters at significant
personal cost may, therefore, be rational in
a dynamic social equilibrium, if not necessarily from a static, individualized perspective. It is this instinct that may be driving
voting behavior as well.
We humans know instinctively—if
not logically—having grown up as social

E

dlin et al.’s reason to “vote for charity’s
sake” was a valiant attempt to justify,
for the hard-nosed logical economist,
why to vote on election day. As any public choice theorist knows, the individual
benefit to voting (as measured by one’s
probable effect on the election outcome) is
too small compared to the individual costs
(as measured in effort and time spent); so
why vote, unless for charity’s sake?
The answer as to why we vote, however, may be simpler than trying to come
up with a hypothetical charity value. It is
likely more instinctual, in the same way
that people in a Public Goods game will
punish cheaters, at significant personal
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animals, that some actions cause minor
immediate personal losses, but are worth
it for a dynamic social existence. Neoclassical models are wonderful at helping us to
understand individual level decision-making when the only benefits and costs that
matter are to a static, inward-looking individual. Our models have a much harder
time (currently) at deciphering actions that
involve dynamic social benefit and cost
considerations.
The answers to questions like Why vote?
and Why punish cheaters? likely don’t lie
in a contrived method to force social considerations into individual benefit and cost
calculations, as was valiantly attempted in
Edlin et al. (who among us is truly aware that
our vote might have a hypothetical charity
value of $50,000?). The answers likely lie
in dynamic social organizing instincts that
are as yet still poorly understood. We don’t
know exactly why we vote, but we will one
day, as economic research broadens into
new and burgeoning fields. And I’m confident the answer will be a rational one from
a more dynamic perspective, because can

130 million voters really have been acting
“irrationally” this past November 4th?

Lea Kosnik
University of Missouri-St. Louis
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